This paper presents a dynamic competitive equilibrium model with heterogeneous time preferences that can account for the observed patterns of wealth and income inequality in the United States. This model generalizes the standard neoclassical growth model by including (i) a demand for status by the consumers and (ii) human capital formation. The …rst feature prevents the wealth distribution from collapsing into a degenerate distribution. The second feature generates a strong positive correlation between earnings and wealth across agents. A calibrated version of this model is able to replicate the wealth and income distributions of the United States.
Introduction
Empirical studies show that individuals do not discount future values at the same rate. 1 Since individuals' investment decisions are strongly a¤ected by the way they discount the future, this type of heterogeneity would naturally lead to inequality in wealth and income. In this paper, we present a dynamic competitive equilibrium model with heterogeneous time preferences that can account for the observed patterns of wealth and income inequality in the United States.
It is well known that standard dynamic competitive equilibrium models have di¢ culty in generating realistic wealth distribution based on heterogeneous time preferences alone. Speci…cally, when consumers have time-additive separable preferences and di¤erent constant discount factors, all the wealth in the model economy will eventually be concentrated in the hands of the most patient consumers. This well-known result is …rst conjectured by Ramsey (1928) and formally proved by Becker (1980) . The current study begins by showing that Becker's result cannot be extended to the case where consumers derive utility from both consumption and wealth. In our baseline model, we adopt the same economic environment as in Becker (1980) , which features a neoclassical production technology, a complete set of competitive markets, consumers with heterogeneous time preferences and a borrowing constraint. The only modi…cation we make is the inclusion of wealth in consumers' preferences. It is formally shown that the baseline model possesses a unique stationary equilibrium in which every consumer owns a positive amount of wealth. A calibrated version of the baseline model is able to replicate some key features of the wealth distribution in the United States. In particular, it is able to generate a large group of wealth-poor consumers and a very small group of extremely wealthy ones. However, the baseline model falls short in explaining income inequality.
This problem remains even if we allow for endogenous labor supply. To overcome this problem, we extend the baseline model by introducing human capital formation. The main idea of this extension is that more patient consumers are more willing to invest in wealth as well as human capital than less patient ones. A higher level of human capital then leads to a higher level of future earnings for the more patient consumers. This gives rise to a strong positive correlation between wealth and earnings which is essential in accounting for wealth and income inequality simultaneously. A calibrated version of this model is able to replicate the distributions of wealth and income in the United States.
In the current study, we assume that consumers value wealth directly in their preferences. This assumption has long been used in economic studies. In an early paper, Kurz (1968) introduces this type of preferences into the optimal growth model and explores the long-run properties of the model. Zou (1994) interprets this type of preferences as re ‡ecting the "capitalist spirit," which refers to the tendency of treating wealth acquisition as an end in itself rather than a means of satisfying material needs. Cole, et al. (1992) suggest that this type of preferences can serve as a reducedform speci…cation to capture people's concern for their relative wealth position or status within society. Subsequent studies have followed these traditions and interpreted this type of preferences as embodying the spirit of capitalism or re ‡ecting the demand for wealth-induced social status.
There is now a growing literature that explores the implications of capitalist spirit on a wide range of issues, including asset pricing, economic growth, the e¤ects of monetary policy and wealth inequality. 2 Among the existing studies, Luo and Young (2009) is most relevant to this paper.
These authors consider an economy in which consumers share the same time preference, concern about their status in the economy and face uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk. They …nd that the demand for social status is a force that tends to reduce wealth inequality. This result is also observed in our model. First, the equilibrium wealth distribution is no longer degenerate once we introduce the demand for social status into Becker's model. Second, in the quantitative analysis, we …nd that wealth inequality decreases as we increase the coe¢ cient that controls the demand for status.
Our baseline model can yield a non-degenerate wealth distribution because adding a demand for status fundamentally changes consumers'investment behavior. In the original Becker (1980) model, a consumer facing a constant interest rate invests according to the following rules: accumulate wealth inde…nitely if the interest rate exceeds his rate of time preference, deplete his wealth until it reaches zero if the opposite is true, and maintain a constant positive level of wealth if the two rates coincide. 2 Studies that explore the implications of capitalist spirit on asset pricing include Bakshi and Chen (1996) , and Boileau and Braeu (2007) among others. Studies on economic growth include Zou (1994) and Smith (1999) Since no one can accumulate wealth inde…nitely in a stationary equilibrium, the equilibrium interest rate is determined by the lowest rate of time preference among the consumers. It follows from the above rules that consumers with a higher rate of time preference would end up having zero wealth.
In contrast, a status-seeking consumer is willing to hold a constant positive amount of wealth even if the equilibrium interest rate is lower than his rate of time preference. The consumer is willing to do so because holding a positive amount of wealth also satis…es his need for status. The demand for status in e¤ect creates some additional rewards from investment other than the market rate of return. These additional rewards keep consumers from depleting their wealth to zero.
How important is the demand for status to our quantitative results? First, the demand for status prevents the wealth distribution from collapsing into a degenerate distribution. This allows us to explore the implications of heterogeneous time preferences on wealth and income inequality.
Our quantitative results show that the extent of wealth inequality is strongly in ‡uenced by the coe¢ cient that controls the demand for status. However, this is not the only decisive factor: the distribution of discount factor plays an equally important role in determining wealth inequality.
Our baseline results also show that the demand for status cannot generate a substantial degree of income inequality. In the model with human capital, the demand for status does not play any role in determining the distributions of hours and labor earnings. These distributions are completely determined by two factors: (i) the distribution of discount factor, and (ii) the parameters in the human capital accumulation process which are chosen based on empirical …ndings. This paper is complementary to two di¤erent groups of studies. The …rst group of studies attempt to explain the observed patterns of income and wealth inequality by considering di¤erent versions of the heterogeneous-agent model à la Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) . In this type of models, income inequality is driven by the exogenous labor income risk, and wealth inequality is largely determined by consumers' precautionary saving motive. It is well-documented that the standard Aiyagari-Huggett model has di¢ culty in generating realistic wealth inequality. 3 Krusell and Smith (1998) show that introducing heterogeneous time preferences can signi…cantly improve the Aiyagari-Huggett model in this regard. To obtain this result, these authors assume that consumers'subjective discount factors are stochastic in nature. The second group of studies are mainly 3 See Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997), and Castañeda, et al. (2003) for detailed discussions of this problem. theoretical studies that establish a non-degenerate wealth distribution in the presence of heterogeneous time preferences. Lucas and Stokey (1984) and Boyd (1990) show that Becker's result is no longer valid when consumers have recursive preferences. Sarte (1997) establishes the existence of a non-degenerate wealth distribution by introducing a progressive tax structure into Becker's model.
More recently, Espino (2005) establishes this result by assuming that consumers have private information over an idiosyncratic preference shock. Sorger (2002 Sorger ( , 2008 show that Becker's result cannot be extended to the case where consumers are strategic players, rather than price-takers, in the capital market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline model environment, presents the main theoretical results and evaluates the quantitative relevance of this model. Section 3 extends the baseline model by including endogenous labor supply. Section 4 presents the extension with human capital formation. Section 5 concludes.
The Baseline Model

Preferences
Consider an economy inhabited by a large number of in…nitely lived agents. The size of population is constant over time and is given by N: Each agent is indexed by a subjective discount factor i ; for i 2 f1; 2; :::; N g : The discount factors are ranked according to 1 > 1 2 : : :
There is a single commodity in this economy which can be used for consumption and investment.
All agents have preferences over streams of consumption and social status, which can be represented
where c it and s it denote the consumption and social status of agent i at time t: The period utility function u : R 2 + ! R is assumed to be identical for all agents and have the following properties:
Assumption A1 The function u (c; s) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave in (c; s) : It also satis…es the Inada condition for consumption, i.e., lim Assumption A2 is imposed to ensure the existence of balanced growth equilibria. Under this assumption, the partial derivatives u c (c; s) and u s (c; s) are both homogeneous of degree : We can then de…ne a function h : R + ! R according to
Under Assumption A1, the function h (z) is continuously di¤erentiable and non-negative. We now impose some additional assumptions on this function.
Assumption A3
The function h (z) de…ned by (2) is strictly increasing and satis…es h (0) = 0
and lim
It is straightforward to check that if u cs (c; s) 0 then h (z) is strictly increasing. The converse, however, is not true in general. In other words, Assumption A3 does not preclude the possibility of having a negative cross-derivative for some values of c and s.
All three assumptions stated above are satis…ed by the following functional forms which are commonly used in the existing literature,
with > 0 and > 0; and
with > 0; 2 (0; 1) and < 1: 4
The Agents'Problem
In each period, each agent is endowed with one unit of time which is supplied inelastically to the market. The agents receive labor income from work and interest income from previous savings. All savings are held in the form of physical capital, which is the only asset in this economy. As in Becker (1980) , the agents are not allowed to borrow so that capital holdings must be non-negative in each period. An agent's social status is measured by the level of wealth owned by the agent at the beginning of the current period. Speci…cally, this means
where k it is the stock of capital owned by agent i at the beginning of time t: The same speci…cation of status is also used in Zou (1994), Bakshi and Chen (1996) and Luo and Young (2009) among others.
Given a sequence of wages and rental rates, the agents' problem is to choose sequences of consumption and capital so as to maximize their discounted lifetime utility, subject to sequences of budget constraints and borrowing constraints. Let w t and r t be the market wage rate and the rental rate of capital at time t: Formally, agent i's problem is given by
and k i0 > 0 given. 5 The parameter 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of capital.
The agents'optimal choices are completely characterized by the sequential budget constraint in 5 In the theoretical and quantitative analyses, we focus on balanced-growth equilibria which are independent of the initial conditions. Thus, the initial distribution of capital across agents is irrelevant to our analyses. (5) , and the Euler equation 
Production
Output is produced according to a standard neoclassical production function:
where Y t denote aggregate output at time t, K t is aggregate capital, L t is aggregate labor and X t is the level of labor-augmenting technology. We will refer to b L t X t L t as the e¤ective unit of labor.
The technological factor is assumed to grow at a constant exogenous rate so that X t t for all t; where 1 is the exogenous growth factor and X 0 is normalized to one. The production function F : R 2 + ! R + is assumed to have all the usual properties which are summarized below.
Assumption A4 The production function F K; b L is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave in each argument. It exhibits constant returns to scale and satis…es the following conditions:
Because of the constant-returns-to-scale assumption, we can focus on a representative …rm whose problem is given by
The solution of this problem is completely characterized by the …rst-order conditions:
where
is the amount of capital per e¤ective unit of labor at time t:
Competitive Equilibrium
Let c t = (c 1t ; c 2t ; :::; c N t ) denote a distribution of consumption across agents at time t and k t = (k 1t ; k 2t ; :::; k N t ) be a distribution of capital at time t. A competitive equilibrium consists of sequences of distributions of consumption and capital, fc t; k t g 1 t=0 ; sequences of aggregate inputs, fK t ; L t g 1 t=0 ; and sequences of prices, fw t ; r t g 1 t=0 ; so that (i) Given the prices fw t ; r t g 1 t=0 ; the sequences fc it ; k it g 1 t=0 solve agent i's problem.
(ii) In each period t 0; given the prices w t and r t ; the aggregate inputs K t and L t solve the representative …rm's problem.
(iii) All markets clear in every period, so that for each t 0;
and
In this paper, we con…ne our attention to balanced-growth equilibria. Formally, a set of sequences
is called a balanced-growth equilibrium if the following conditions are satis…ed:
(i) S is a competitive equilibrium as de…ned above.
(ii) The rental rate of capital is stationary over time, i.e., r t = r for all t:
(iii) Individual consumption and capital, aggregate capital and the wage rate are all growing at the same constant rate. In particular, the common growth factor is 1:
Theoretical Results
The main objective of this subsection is to show that, under certain conditions, the baseline model possesses a unique balanced-growth equilibrium in which all agents hold a strictly positive amount of capital. Before stating the formal theorem, we need to introduce some additional notations.
A balanced-growth equilibrium for this economy is characterized by a constant rental rate r which clears the capital market. Once the equilibrium rental rate is determined, all other variables in a balanced-growth equilibrium can be uniquely determined. Thus it su¢ ces to establish the existence and uniqueness of r . To achieve this, we …rst formulate the supply and demand for capital as a function of r:
Denote by b k d (r) the amount of capital per e¤ective unit of labor that the representative …rm desires when the rental rate is r: The function b k d (r) is implicitly de…ned by the condition:
Under Assumption A4, the function b k d : R ++ ! R + is continuously di¤erentiable and strictly decreasing. Moreover, b k d (r) approaches in…nity as r tends to zero from the right and approaches zero as r tends to in…nity. If r is an equilibrium rental rate, then the equilibrium wage rate at time t is uniquely determined by w t = t b w (r) ; where 
where b 1 + : Under Assumptions A2 and A3, the Euler equation can be expressed as it is never optimal for any agent i to choose a zero value for b k i : 7 It follows that the Euler equation for consumption will always hold with equality in a balanced-growth equilibrium. Combining equations (9) and (10) gives
which determines the relationship between b k i and r: Formally, this can be expressed as
where g i : (0; b r i ) ! R + is a continuously di¤erentiable function implicitly de…ned by (11) .
Denote by b k s (r) the aggregate supply of capital per e¤ective unit of labor when the rental rate is r 2 (0; b r 1 ) : Formally, this is de…ned as
Since each g i (r) is continuous on (0; b r 1 ) ; the function b k s (r) is also continuous on this range. A balanced-growth equilibrium exists if there exists at least one value r within the range (0; b r 1 ) that 6 If r exceeds b r1; then the Euler equation will not be satis…ed for some agents and so r cannot be an equilibrium rental rate. 7 To see this, suppose the contrary that some agent i chooses to have b ki = 0 in a balanced-growth equilibrium. Then the right-hand side of (10) would become in…nite as lim z!1 h (z) = 1 under Assumption A3. This clearly exceeds the left-hand side of the inequality for any r 2 (0; b r1) and hence gives rise to a contradiction. This also means that in order to have b ki > 0 in equilibrium, one can replace the assumption of lim
in Assumption A3.
solves the capital market equilibrium condition:
Once r is determined, all other variables, including the cross-sectional distributions of consumption and capital (c t; k t ) ; the aggregate capital K t and the wage rate w t , can be uniquely determined. If there exists at most one such value of r ; then the balanced-growth equilibrium is unique.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section. Theorem 1 states the conditions under which a unique balanced-growth equilibrium exists. The formal proof of this result can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumptions A1-A4 are satis…ed. Suppose the following condition holds
Then there exists a unique balanced-growth equilibrium in which all agents hold a strictly positive amount of capital. In addition, more patient agents would have more consumption and hold more capital than less patient ones, i.e., i > j implies b c i > b c j and
We now explain the intuitions behind Theorem 1. To facilitate comparison with the original result in Becker (1980), we set = 1 for the moment. For each i 2 f1; 2; :::; N g ; the parameter i 1= i 1 is the rate of time preference for agent i: In a world where status is not valued, an agent in a stationary equilibrium will invest according to the following rules: accumulate capital inde…nitely if the e¤ective return from investment (r ) exceeds his rate of time preference, deplete capital until it reaches zero if the e¤ective return is lower than his rate of time preference, and maintain a constant positive capital stock if the two are equal. Since there is only one e¤ective return from investment, it is not possible for agents with di¤erent rates of time preference to maintain a constant capital stock simultaneously. At the same time, no one can accumulate capital inde…nitely in a stationary equilibrium. Thus the e¤ective return must be equated to the lowest rate of time preference among the agents. It follows that only the most patient agents will hold a positive level of capital in the steady state, and that all other agents with a higher rate of time preference will deplete their capital until it reaches zero.
Introducing a demand for status breaks this spell by creating some additional bene…ts of holding capital. These additional bene…ts induce a change in consumers'investment behavior. In particular, a status-seeking agent is willing to maintain a constant positive capital stock even if the e¤ective return from investment is lower than his rate of time preference. This is made clear by the Euler Condition (13) in Theorem 1 is imposed to ensure that the equilibrium rental rate r is greater than b : According to (9) , r > b is both necessary and su¢ cient to guarantee that individual consumption and capital holdings are positively correlated in the balanced-growth equilibrium.
Calibration
Our goal here is to evaluate the ability of the baseline model to replicate the observed patterns of inequality in the United States. To achieve this, we have to …rst specify the form of the utility function and the production function, and assign speci…c values to the model parameters. Some of these values are chosen based on empirical …ndings. Others are chosen to match some real-world targets. This details of this procedure are explained below.
Functional Forms and Parameters
In the numerical exercise, the production function is given by
with 2 (0; 1) : The period utility function is assumed to be additively separable as in (3) . In this functional form, the parameter captures the importance of social status in consumers'preferences.
The original Becker model corresponds to the case in which = 0: The additively separable speci…cation is chosen for the following reasons. In the current model, individuals'investment decisions are completely characterized by equation (11) . Under the additively separable utility function, this equation can be expressed as
Under the non-separable functional form in (4), this equation becomes
A direct comparison of these equations suggests that they can be made identical by a suitable choice of parameter values. When this is imposed, all agents will have the same optimal investment rule g i (r) under the two speci…cations of u (c; s). It follows that the equilibrium rental rate r and the wealth distribution will also be identical. This result can be stated formally as follows. are likely to yield quantitatively similar results in the balanced-growth equilibrium. 9 We choose the additively separable form because it involves fewer parameters. households. The estimated rate of time preference for the richest …ve percent is 0.8 percent, which corresponds to a discount factor of 0.992. 10 In the benchmark scenario, we consider a hypothetical population of 1,000 agents with discount factors uniformly distributed between 0.966 and 0.992.
This implies an average discount factor of 0.979. After presenting the benchmark results, we will examine the e¤ects of changing the distribution of discount factors.
Our aim here is to illustrate the relationship between and the degree of inequality in the wealth and income distributions. To achieve this, we consider di¤erent values of ranging from 0.005 to 0.5. For each value of ; the depreciation rate ( ) is chosen so that the capital-output ratio is 3.0. The reported results include the Gini coe¢ cients for wealth and income, the coe¢ cients of variation for wealth and income, and the shares of wealth held by the bottom and top percentiles of the wealth distribution. The data of these inequality measures are taken from Rodríguez, et al. (2002) .
Wealth and Income Inequality
The results in Table 2 show a strong negative relationship between wealth inequality and the value of : This can also be seen from Figure 1 Consequently, the model generates a slightly more equal wealth distribution than that observed in the United States.
As the value of increases, wealth becomes more and more uniformly distributed across the agents. This can be explained as follows. Holding other things constant, an increase in raises the marginal utility of status. In other words, the same increase in capital holdings can now generate a larger gain in utility. This e¤ectively diminishes the di¤erences in discount factor across agents.
To see this formally, set = 1 and rewrite equation (14) as
Totally di¤erentiate this with respect to i and z i
This expression tells us how the variations in discount factor across agents are transformed into variations in z i under a given value of r: According to this expression, the variations in z i diminish as the value of increases. Since there is an one-to-one relationship between z i and b k i ; this means the variations in b k i also diminish as increases. In the limiting case where converges to in…nity, all agents have the same level of b k i which means perfect equality in wealth distribution. In other words, the e¤ects of heterogeneous discount factors vanish when is su¢ ciently large.
The results in Table 2 also show that the current model tends to generate a relatively low degree of income inequality. This is true even when there is substantial inequality in wealth. For instance, when = 0:0177; the Gini coe¢ cient for income is 0.235, as compared to 0.713 for wealth. This occurs because labor income represents a sizable portion of total income for most of the agents in this economy. Table 3 shows the share of total income from labor income for di¤erent wealth groups. When is 0.0177 or less, labor income accounts for more than 80 percent of total income for the majority of the agents. Since there is no variation in labor income across agents, the extent of income inequality is thus low.
In sum, our quantitative results show that the baseline model is able to replicate some key features of the wealth distribution in the United States. However, it falls short of explaining income inequality. This is partly because there is no variation in labor income across agents. The two extensions considered in Sections 3 and 4 are intended to change this feature of the baseline model.
Changing the Range of Discount Factors
In the benchmark scenario, the minimum and the maximum values of discount factor are 0.966 and 0.992, respectively. We now consider …ve di¤erent variations of these values. We maintain the uniform distribution assumption in each case. In the …rst variation, the benchmark values are both reduced by 0.01 so that min = 0:956 and max = 0:982:
In the second variation, the benchmark values are both reduced by 0.02. In these two experiments, the di¤erence between the minimum and the maximum values, 4 j max min j ; is the same as in the benchmark case. In the third and fourth experiments, this di¤erence is reduced by half.
Speci…cally, we consider the upper half of the benchmark interval in the third experiment, so that min = 0:979 and max = 0:992; and the lower half in the fourth one. In the …nal experiment, we extend the benchmark interval to the left by 50 percent, so that min = 0:953 and max = 0:992: Table 4 In sum, these experiments show that wealth inequality in the baseline model is sensitive to changes in the di¤erence between max and min but not so sensitive to changes in the actual values of max and min :
Endogenous Labor Supply
In this section, we extend the baseline model to include endogenous labor supply decisions. The agents'period utility function is now given by
where l denote the amount of time spent on working, is a positive parameter and > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) of labor. The agents'labor income is now endogenously determined by their choice of working hours. The rest of the model is the same as in Section 2.
A balanced-growth equilibrium for this economy can be de…ned similarly as in Section 2.4. This type of equilibrium now includes, among other things, a stationary distribution of labor which is represent by l = (l 1 ; l 2; :::; l N ) : Let b k d (r) and b w (r) be the functions de…ned in (7) and (8) . The equilibrium values of
and the equilibrium rental rate r are determined by
where b 1 + : Equation (16) is the Euler equation for consumption evaluated along a balanced-growth path. Equation (17) is the …rst-order condition with respect to labor. Equation (18) is derived from the agent's budget constraint. Equation (19) is the capital market equilibrium condition.
We now consider the same numerical exercise as in Section 2.6. The production function again takes the Cobb-Douglas form and the parameter values in Table 1 are used. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor is set to 0.4. 11 To check the robustness of our …ndings, we also consider two other values of this elasticity, which are 0.2 and 1.0. As in Section 2.6, we focus on the relationship between and the degree of inequality in wealth and income. We consider the same set of values for as in Table 2 . In each case, the preference parameter is chosen so that the average amount of time spent on working is one-third and the depreciation rate is chosen so that the capital-output ratio is 3.0. Table 5 shows the inequality measures obtained under = 0:4: When comparing these to the baseline results in Table 2 , it is immediate to see that the two sets of results are almost identical.
Introducing endogenous labor supply decisions does not change the fundamental mechanism in the 1 1 The same value is used in Kim (2006, 2007) among others.
baseline model. In particular, the model continues to generate a high degree of wealth inequality when is small and a relatively low degree of income inequality in general. Our numerical results
show that allowing for endogenous labor supply actually lowers the Gini coe¢ cient for income.
This can be explained by Figure 2 , which shows the relationship between discount factor and labor supply. Most of the agents in this economy, except those who are very patient, choose to have the same amount of labor. Consequently, the distribution of labor is close to uniform with a long left tail. 12 This explains why the extended model generates a similar degree of income inequality as the baseline model. Since labor supply decreases as the discount factor increases, an impatient agent has less capital income but more labor income than a (very) patient agent. In other words, the two sources of income are negatively correlated. This negative correlation in e¤ect reduces the degree of income inequality in the extended model.
Finally, Table 6 shows that the results in Table 5 are robust to changes in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor. Speci…cally, increasing the elasticity from 0.2 to 1.0 only marginally a¤ects the Gini coe¢ cients for wealth and income.
Human Capital Formation
The Model
In this section, we extend the baseline model to include human capital formation. The agents' period utility function is now given by u (c; s) = log c + log s; > 0:
In each period, all agents are endowed with one unit of time which they can divide between market work and on-the-job training. Denote by h it the stock of human capital of agent i at time t: If this agent chooses to spend a fraction l it 2 [0; 1] of time on market work at time t; then his human capital at time t + 1 is given by
where > 0; 2 (0; 1) ; 2 (0; 1) ; and h 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of human capital. The agent's labor income at time t is given by w t l it h it : We refer to l it h it as the e¤ective unit of labor and w t as the market wage rate for e¤ective unit of labor.
Let r t be the rental rate of physical capital at time t: Agent i's problem is now given by
the human capital accumulation equation in (20) , and the initial conditions: k i0 > 0 and h i0 > 0:
The parameter k 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of physical capital. The rest of the model economy is the same as in Section 2. In particular, long-term growth in per-capita variables is again fueled by an exogenous improvement in labor-augmenting technology. 13 The exogenous growth factor is again given by 1:
A balanced-growth equilibrium for this economy can be de…ned similarly as in Section 2.4. In here we only present the key equations that characterize this type of equilibrium. A formal de…nition can be found in Appendix B. A balanced-growth equilibrium now includes, among other things, a stationary distribution of labor, l = (l 1 ; l 2 ; :::; l N ) ; and a stationary distribution of human capital, h = (h 1 ; h 2 ; :::; h N ) : The equilibrium values of
where b 1 + k : Equations (21) and (22) are derived from the Euler equation for consumption and the agent's budget constraint. Equations (23) and (24) are derived from the …rst-order conditions with respect to l it and h it+1 ; and the human capital accumulation equation. Equation (25) is the capital market equilibrium condition. The mathematical derivations of these can be found in Appendix B.
According to (23) and (24), the distributions of labor and human capital are completely determined by two factors: (i) the distribution of subjective discount factor and (ii) the parameters in the human capital accumulation process. In particular, these two distributions are independent of the period utility function u (c; s), and thus the demand for status. If social status is not valued, i.e., u s (c; s) 0; then the distribution of capital is degenerate but the distributions of labor and human capital are non-degenerate.
Calibration
Parameters
In the quantitative exercise, we use the same speci…cation for production technology, and the same distribution of discount factor as before. Speci…cally, the production function for goods takes the Cobb-Douglas form with = 0:33: The population contains 1,000 agents with subjective discount factors uniformly distributed between 0.966 and 0.992. Other studies in the existing literature …nd that this rate is usually small and close to zero. 15 We use a depreciation rate of 3 percent, which is consistent with the estimates reported in Haley (1976) .
It is now clear that the choice of is key to explaining wealth inequality. In here we choose the value of so as to match the Gini coe¢ cient for wealth as reported in Rodríguez, et al. (2002) .
Speci…cally, we target a value of 0.803 for the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth. The required value of is 0.0139. As explained above, the distributions of labor and human capital are independent of :
Thus the distribution of earnings reported below is not in ‡uenced by this parameter. Finally, the depreciation rate of physical capital is chosen so that the capital-output ratio is 3.0. The parameter 1 4 The results for = 0:945 and = 0:832 are available from the author upon request. 1 values used in the quantitative exercise are summarized in Table 7 .
Findings Table 8 summarizes the characteristics of the earnings, income and wealth distributions generated by the model. The …rst three columns of the table show the Gini coe¢ cients, the coe¢ cients of variation and the mean-to-median ratios for the three variables. The mean-to-median ratio is intended to measure the degree of skewness in these distributions. The rest of Table 8 shows the share of earnings, income and wealth held by agents in di¤erent percentiles of the corresponding distribution.
First, consider the statistics of the wealth distribution. Similar to the baseline model, this extension is able to replicate some key features of the wealth distribution in the United States. In particular, the model continues to generate a large group of wealth-poor agents and a small group of extremely wealthy agents. For instance, the share of total wealth owned by the agents in the second quintile of the wealth distribution is merely 1.2 percent, whereas the share owned by the wealthiest …ve percent is 52.9 percent. These …gures are very close to the actual value observed in the United States, which are 1.3 percent and 57.8 percent, respectively. The model is also to match quite closely the share of total wealth owned by agents in the other quintiles. As for the income distribution, the model is able to generate a Gini coe¢ cient and a mean-to-median ratio that are close to the observed values. Except for the top one percent of the income distribution, the model is able to replicate almost exactly the share of aggregate income owned by agents in di¤erent income groups.
As for earnings, the model yields a more equal distribution than that observed in the data.
In the model economy, the earnings-poor agents own a larger share of total earnings than their real-world counterparts, while the earnings-rich agents own a lower share than that observed in the data. For instance, agents in the second quintile of the earning distribution hold 7. 
The second step is to show that there exists at most one solution on the interval (0; e r 1 ) : Together, these two steps show that a unique r exists in the interval b ; e r 1 : Finally, it is shown that i > j
Step 1 For each i 2 f1; 2; :::; N g ; one can show that there exists a unique value e r i > b that solves By the de…nitions of g 1 (r) and e r 1 ; it must be the case that g 1 (r) ! 1 as r approaches e r 1 from the left. Since e r 1 e r i < b r i for any i 2; we have g i (r) > 0 for all i 2 when r is arbitrarily close to e r 1 : Thus, as r approaches e r 1 from the left, we have
equation (11) 
Let r be any solution of (26) . The derivative of b k s (r) at r = r is This gives rise to a contradiction and hence establishes the uniqueness of r :
Step 3 Totally di¤erentiate the equation Hence i > j implies b k i > b k j : Since the equilibrium rental rate r is strictly greater than b ; b c i is positively related to b k i according to (9) .
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. (ii) In each period t 0; given the prices w t and r t ; the aggregate inputs K t and L t solve the representative …rm's problem.
Appendix B
A set of sequences S = fc t; k t ; l t ; h t ; K t ; L t ; w t ; r t g 1 t=0 is called a balanced-growth equilibrium if the following conditions are satis…ed:
(iii) The distributions of labor and human capital are stationary over time.
(iv) Individual consumption and capital, aggregate capital and the wage rate are all growing at the same constant rate. In particular, the common growth factor is 1:
We now provide the mathematical derivations of equations (21)- (24) . Let it and it be the multipliers for the budget constraint and the human capital accumulation equation, respectively.
The …rst-order conditions for the agent's problem are given by u c (c it ; k it ) = it ; (27) it w t h it = it (1 l it ) 1 h it ;
Combining (27) and (29) gives u c (c it ; k it ) u c (c it+1 ; k it+1 ) = i u s (c it+1 ; k it+1 ) u c (c it+1 ; k it+1 ) + 1 + r t+1 k :
Equation (21) can be obtained from this after imposing the balanced-growth conditions: c it = t b c i and k it = t b k i : The derivation of (22) is straightforward and is omitted. Along a balancedgrowth equilibrium path, individual human capital is stationary. It follows from the human capital accumulation equation that
Equation (24) follows immediately from this expression. Finally, combining (28) and (30) gives
In the balanced-growth equilibrium, the multiplier it is stationary over time. To see this, combine (27) and (28) to get
In a balanced-growth equilibrium, l it and h it are stationary while w t and c it are growing at the same rate. Thus it must be stationary over time. Thus, in this kind of equilibrium, we have
Equation (23) can be obtained by substituting (24) into this.
